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The Superannuation Surcharge Tax (SST) is a hidden tax, with significant effects on (so-
called) higher income taxpayers. The SST was introduced in August 1996, and, according 
to the Australian Taxation Office, ‘is intended to limit the concessionality of employer 
and deductible personal superannuation contributions for high income earners’. For the 
2000/01 year it is levied at a rate of up to 15% on the surchargeable contributions of 
fund members whose adjusted taxable income exceeds the surcharge threshold of 
$81,493. This paper  investigates the compliance costs on the industry. Other aspects 
such as SST start-up costs and industry attitudes are also assessed for the year 2000/01. 
Findings are based on an in-depth, quantitative and qualitative survey of 40 fund 
managers and administrators who appreciated the value of this research and sacrificed 
their time to provide us with data. Respondent funds account for 6.5% of superannuation 
fund members in Australia (the ‘fund member population’) and 3.8% of superannuation 
assets in Australia (the ‘fund asset population’). 
 
SST (recurrent) compliance costs are falling over time, from an estimated $691 pa per 
SST member in 1997/98 to $140 pa per SST member in 2000/01 (mean estimate). The 
authors are reluctant to make aggregate compliance cost estimates essentially because of 
the very small number of funds providing compliance cost data. However, given this 
caveat and the usual qualifications found in most compliance cost studies, estimated 
gross recurrent compliance costs of the SST are very tentatively and conservatively 
estimated at $76 million for 2000/01, representing around 11% of SST tax revenue of 
$699 million (ATO data). It must be emphasised that this estimate is derived from the 
median estimate of $84 per SST member from relatively larger superannuation funds that 
theoretically should have lower compliance costs per SST member than smaller funds. 
Further, and tending to lower SST compliance costs expressed as a percentage of tax 
revenue, SST revenue has been forecast to rise to around $820 million in 2001/02 and 
2002/03.  
 
The superannuation industry, professional, tax and accounting bodies, and specialists in 
the field are all overwhelmingly critical of the SST for a variety of reasons, particularly 
eits inefficiency, high compliance costs and inequity (because SST compliance costs are 
spread over all fund members). Around 80% of survey responses indicated industry 
support for the abolition of the SST to be given a high priority status. 
 
The fundamental conclusion of this research is that SST should be abolished at the 
earliest opportunity. The major reasons are its: inefficiency; high compliance costs; 
inequity in practice between superannuation fund members; and particularly its lack of 













                                                
 
Introduction 
This paper presents the key findings on SST compliance costs from an independent 
research project into the hidden costs of the SST1. The major objective is to provide an 
estimate of SST compliance costs (or hidden costs), defined as start-up and recurrent 
(gross) compliance costs of the SST.  
 
This paper is presented as follows. First, following this introduction, the nature and 
organisation of superannuation and the industry in Australia is briefly reviewed. Next, 
section 2 discusses the background and approach of this study and the characteristics of 
the funds surveyed. Section 3 considers the characteristics and time trends of SST 
compliance costs. Section 4 considers the composition of SST compliance costs. The 
effect of abolishing SST but not the reporting requirement on fund members is discussed 
in section 5, followed by a drawing together of the main policy criteria and implications, 
with appropriate caveats in section 6. The qualitative aspects of this research, namely the 
views of fund managers on the SST and possible reform measures, follow in section 7. 
These are presented where possible in respondents’ own words, for greater clarity and 
impact. The final section concludes this timely research. Further work is also briefly 
considered. 
 
It should be noted that the research was based on the year 2000/01, and thus generally 
used 2000/01 estimates and data, based on our survey year and data availability from 
Government, the industry and other sources. However, where later data and information 
for 2001/02 was available this was cited. Unfortunately, in some parts of this research 
only data for earlier years was available. Further, our research d 
The Industry 
 
Superannuation is a form of savings and investment for the retirement of individuals. It 
affects the lives of nearly all the Australian population in one way or another. There are 
around 23.24 million accounts (some members have more than one account) in 226,480 
funds holding around $527 billion in assets (Rice and McEwin, 2002; APRA, 2002). It 
has been estimated that, in aggregate terms, total employer and member contributions for 
superannuation account for just under six per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Clare, 1998, p1). Of this around half is compulsory under the Superannuation Guarantee 
and the other half are ‘more or less’ voluntary contributions. The Government provides 
an Age Pension and other social security benefits for many retirees. This amounted to an 
 
1 The full report by Pope, Fernandez and Le (2003), The Hidden Costs of the Superannuation Surcharge 
Tax, is available from the Australian Tax Research Foundation, Sydney. The impact of the SST on 
individual taxpayers’ effective marginal tax rates, typically ‘hidden’ and ignored in nearly all commentaries 
on individual income tax rates in Australia, is not discussed in this paper. Findings on this are presented in 











estimated $18 billion in 1997/98, or 3.3% of GDP. This is low by international standards 
in developed countries, where the OECD average is 9% and rising (ibid.). Industry 
analysts and policy makers talk of the ‘three pillars of Australian retirement income 
provision’, namely a public sector ‘safety net’; compulsory self-provision; and 
encouragement of voluntary self-provision (ibid.). All of these pillars are inter-twined 
through Government taxation and social security policy in general and the taxation of 
superannuation in particular. One particular issue of note is the size of the tax expenditure 
(concession or tax relief) for superannuation. A Treasury estimate places the value of 
superannuation tax concessions at $8.7 billion in 1996/97, yet this has been disputed by 
Access Economics (1998). They argue that, when future benefits through reduced social 
security requirements are taken into account, superannuation is overtaxed by $1.7 billion 
using 1995/96 figures (ibid., p2). 
 
The superannuation industry is organised into self-managed, wholesale (public sector, 
corporate and industry funds) and retail funds. The vast majority of funds by number are 
self-managed (222,738, or 95%) yet have only a small number of accounts (0.39 million 
or 1.6%). By contrast, corporate (3,235 in number), industry (139) and Government (94) 
funds account for 1.57 million, 6.98 million and 2.85 million fund accounts respectively. 
Retail funds, numbering 274, are sub-divided into employer master trust (2.78 million 
fund accounts), personal superannuation (4.02 million), Post Retirement (0.58 million), 
Retirement Savings Accounts (1.41 million) and Eligible Rollover Funds (2.68 million). 
The key features of the superannuation industry in terms of fund type, assets, the number 








Overview of the Superannuation Industry for 2001 
Funds under the SIS Act    Fund 
Typea 
 
Corporate Industry Public 
Sector 





Jun 3,235 139 94 274 3,742 222,738b 226,480 NA 226,480Number of 
Funds Dec 2,967 128 91 252 3438 230,500 233,938 NA 233,938
Jun 1.43 0.06 0.04 0.12 1.65 98.35 100 NA 100 Number of 
Funds 
(%) Dec 1.27 0.05 0.04 0.11 1.47 98.53 100 NA 100 











($billion) Dec 73.0 47.1 109.8 170.4 400.3 93.5 493.8 33.9 527.7 
Jun 14.06 8.51 21.76 29.88 74.21 16.54 90.75 9.25 100 
Assets (%) 
Dec 13.83 8.9 20.83 32.2 75.76 17.8 93.56 6.44 100 
Jun 1.4 6.9 2.8 11.3 22.4 0.4 22.9 NA 22.9 Members 
Accounts 
(million) Dec 1.5 7.2 2.8 11.9 23.4 0.4 23.7 NA 23.7 
Jun 6.21 30.16 12.41 49.52 98.30 1.70 100 NA 100 Members 
Accounts 
(%) Dec 6.33 30.38 11.81 50.21 98.31 1.69 100 NA 100 
 
Source: APRA (2002), ‘Superannuation Trends – December Quarter 2001’ 
Notes: 
(a) This table excludes Retirement Savings Accounts.  
(b) 8,052 of these funds were Small APRA funds (SAFs) and 214,686 were Self Managed Superannuation 
Funds (SMSFs) regulated by the ATO. 




Thus less than 2 per cent of funds are standard employer funds or public offer funds that 
provide over 98% of Australians with superannuation (APRA, 2001). A large proportion 
of the remaining funds are small funds with less than 5 members. The bulk of fund 
members (90%) belong to the top 200 funds.  
 
There is no governing prudential body that oversees all funds in Australia.  Self Managed 
Superannuation Funds (SMSFs) are supervised by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). 
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is a statutory body2 established 
to oversee the operation of superannuation funds and Retirement Savings Accounts 
(RSAs); however its powers are somewhat limited by the legislation3. The Association of 
Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) is the leading industry body with data 
collection and research expertise, as well as advocacy and lobbying skills.  
 
The taxation of superannuation in Australia is complex. In addition to taxing members’ 
contributions into the fund at the rate of 15%, the earnings within the superannuation 
funds are also taxed at 15%. A complex tax regime determines the amount of exit tax 
imposed when the funds are paid out to the members.  The introduction of the 
Superannuation Surcharge Tax (SST) in 1996 adds to the complexity to the taxation of 
superannuation funds. For the 2000/01 year, the SST is levied at a rate of up to 15% on 
                                                 
2 The legislation that established APRA is the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998. 











                                                
the surchargeable contributions of fund members whose adjusted taxable income exceeds 
the surcharge threshold of $81,493. The SST becomes fully liable at the 15% rate at 
adjusted taxable income levels of $98,955 and above in 2000/01. The starting threshold is 
indexed each year. 
 
Since the adjustable taxable income include a member’s taxable income, surchargeable 
contributions and reportable fringe benefits (as from 30 June 2000), the SST can impact 
on taxpayers with taxable incomes well below $81,493. A member with taxable income 
of $60,000 per annum may not have enough retirement income and may want large 
contributions to catch up. Contributions amounting to 36% of $60,000 taxable income 
would attract SST in 2000/01. This is likely to discourage a member from saving for 
retirement. According to the ATO, the SST ‘is intended to limit the concessionality of 
employer and deductible personal superannuation contributions for high income earners’.  
 
Taxation of Superannuation  
 
The taxation of superannuation funds is a complex area and is only briefly summarised 
here. When a person makes a contribution to a superannuation fund, an Approved 
Deposit Fund (ADF), a Pooled Superannuation Trust (PST) or a Retirement Savings 
Account (RSA), the contribution is taxed at three levels before being paid out as 
retirement income. These three levels4 are: 
• Contributions to the fund; 
• Income earned in the fund; 
• Taxation on withdrawal of benefits. 
 
A fourth level of tax, the Superannuation Surcharge Tax (SST) was introduced in 1996. 
The SST only applies if a members’ adjusted taxable income exceeds the surchargeable 
threshold. The rate at which SST is charged also varies from 0% to 15%, depending on 
members’ adjusted taxable income. For the year 2000/01, adjusted taxable income of 
$81,493 would have attracted SST at 0% rate, whereas adjusted taxable income of 
$98,955 would have attracted SST at the full 15% rate. The SST adds to the complexity 
to the taxation of superannuation funds. 
The person making the contributions may also be entitled to tax deductions and tax 
rebates. 
 
Role and Purpose of SST 
 
 
4 Some commentators state four levels with SST being in addition to the contributions tax applicable to all 











                                                
The Superannuation Surcharge Tax (SST) is an incremental tax of up to 15%5 levied on 
surchargeable superannuation contributions of high income earners, i.e. members whose 
adjusted taxable income exceeds the surcharge threshold for that income year.6 For the 
2002 income year, the adjusted taxable income of over $85,242 will attract SST, with the 
maximum 15% rate applying when adjusted taxable income reaches $103,507.7  For the 
year 2000-01, the surchargeable thresholds ranged from $81,493 to a 15% maximum 
applying to $98,955. The starting threshold is indexed each year. The SST is in addition 
to the 15% contributions tax referred to above.   
 
The introduction of the SST in August 1996 was claimed to be a response to concerns 
over the tax advantages afforded to high-income earners through superannuation tax 
concessions that are less readily available to lower income earners. Other commentators 
considered it as an expedient means for the Government to raise additional revenue. The 
effect of the SST in improving equity appears somewhat limited as high income earners 
still have the most to gain from superannuation, even after the introduction of the SST, 
due to their resources for moving funds away from more highly taxed forms of savings 
towards higher levels of retirement incomes, without affecting their consumption (Kehl, 
2001).    However, it is doubtful whether superannuation will continue to remain an 
attractive investment for high income earners, considering that individuals are entitled to 
a 50 per cent discount on capital gains made on or after 21 September 1999, compared to 
only a 33.3 per cent discount for certain superannuation funds.  
 
The Government has proposed to reduce the top rate of SST to 13.5% as from 1 July 
2002 for the 2002/03 tax year, with further reductions in subsequent years to 12% in 
2003/04 and 10.5% in 2004/05. It has been estimated by the Treasury (Budget Papers, 
2002-03) that SST revenue would be reduced by around $60 million, to around $760 
million in 2004/058. It should be noted that the SST base is continuing to broaden 





5 The SST rate is being reduced, commencing in the 2002-03 tax year, under the Superannuation 
Legislation Amendment Bill 2002. From 1 July 2002, the rate will be reduced to 13.5%, followed by 12% 
from 1 July 2003 and 10.5% from 1 July 2004. At the time of writing the legislation had not passed through 
Parliament. PRAFULA PLS CHECK. MESSY! IS IT STILL GOING THRU? 
6 Section 7(2) of Superannuation Contributions Tax (Assessment and Collection) Act 1997. 
7 The surcharge threshold is indexed each year in accordance with Section 9(2) of Superannuation 
Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992. 
8 The Taxation Institute of Australia (2001) estimated a much higher reduction, namely that this measure 
will reduce SST revenue to around $400 million in 2004/05 (ie a reduction of around $190 million on 











                                                
This paper presents the key findings on SST compliance costs from an independent 
research project into the hidden costs of the SST9. The major objective is to provide an 
estimate of SST compliance costs (or hidden costs), defined as start-up and recurrent 
(gross) compliance costs of the SST.  
 
The methodology adopted in this study was the collection and analysis of both primary 
and secondary data. Original, primary data has been collected by means of a depth survey 
of respondent fund administrators. Although this research’s survey of 40 funds was very 
small in the context of tax compliance literature, given the quality of the data and the 
dearth of other estimates in this field, the authors’ consider it appropriate to draw 
conclusions and policy recommendations on the basis of the data provided. Moreover, 
our data has been crosschecked and compared with other data from both the 
superannuation industry and professional bodies wherever possible. Respondent funds 
account for 6.5% of superannuation fund members in Australia (the ‘fund member 
population’) and 3.8% of superannuation assets in Australia (the ‘fund asset population’), 
and this increases the authors’ confidence in our findings. 
 
This research is presented as follows. First, in this introduction, the nature and 
organisation of superannuation and the industry in Australia is briefly reviewed. Next, 
section 2 discusses the background and approach of this study and the characteristics of 
the funds surveyed. Section 3 considers the characteristics and time trends of SST 
compliance costs. Section 4 considers the composition of SST compliance costs. The 
effect of abolishing SST but not the reporting requirement on fund members is discussed 
in section 5, followed by a drawing together of the main policy criteria and implications, 
with appropriate caveats in section 6. The qualitative aspects of this research, namely the 
views of fund managers on the SST and possible reform measures, follow in section 7. 
These are presented where possible in respondents’ own words, for greater clarity and 
impact. The final section concludes this timely research. Further work is also briefly 
considered. 
 
It should be noted that this study is based on the year 2000/01, and thus generally uses 
2000/01 estimates and data, based on both our survey year and data availability from 
Government, the industry and other sources. However, where later data and information 
for 2001/02 is available this is cited. Unfortunately, in some parts of this research only 
data for earlier years is available. Further, this study focuses on the industry’s tax 
compliance costs. The compliance costs of the SST borne directly by individual 
taxpayers rather than the industry are recognised but beyond the scope of this study. Also, 
the Australian Taxation Office’s administrative costs of the SST in particular and 
superannuation taxation overall are recognised but not considered in any detail. 
 
9 The full report by Pope, Fernandez and Le (2003), The Hidden Costs of the Superannuation Surcharge 
Tax, is available from the Australian Tax Research Foundation, Sydney. The impact of the SST on 
individual taxpayers’ effective marginal tax rates, typically ‘hidden’ and ignored in nearly all commentaries 
on individual income tax rates in Australia, is not discussed in this paper. Findings on this are presented in 











                                                
         
 
Background and Characteristics of the Funds Surveyed 
 
From a theoretical perspective, it is worth re-iterating that this study focuses on the 
compliance costs of the SST from an industry perspective, as it is funds that are likely to 
bear the greatest relative burden. Funds thus maintain superannuation records, submit 
information to the ATO and largely deal with any disputes. Of course individuals may 
spend time verifying their contributions, the calculation of adjusted taxable income and 
SST liability as calculated by the ATO, and any ensuing disputes. Individuals also have 
to consider their surcharge position when they contemplate making any salary sacrifice or 
member deductible contributions. This study acknowledges such ‘individual’ SST 
compliance costs (as opposed to ‘fund’ SST compliance costs) but unfortunately a 
separate study of the compliance cost burden of the SST upon individuals was beyond the 
scope of this study.    
 
This section presents findings from an in-depth study of the recurrent compliance costs of 
superannuation funds drawn from the ‘Top 300’ funds by asset size in Australia in 2001 
(Super Review, 2001). It is worth noting that our researchstudy did not benefit from the 
formal support of the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) or any 
other industry body. Moreover, for ethical reasons, we did not offer any inducements 
such as small gifts or prizes for participation. The cost information we requested was 
reasonably complex for respondents to derive and would have needed at least several 
hours to extract and present in the format we requested. Thus our findings are based on 
up to 40 respondent funds, representing 6.5% of superannuation fund members in 
Australia (the ‘fund member population’) and 3.8% of superannuation assets in Australia 
(the ‘fund asset population’)10. Such figures increase confidence in our later findings. 
However, we recognize and acknowledge that our findings are based on funds from only 
a small part of this massive, complex industry and must therefore be treated with caution. 
In a sense our findings are indicative and can only ‘paint a picture’ of the likely impost of 
the SST on the industry as a whole. They do, however, shed light on an aspect of 
Australian taxation policy that, since its introduction, has been subject to much disquiet 
both in the industry and by those higher income taxpayers that are liable for SST. As is 
often the case with (recurrent) tax compliance costs, placing a monetary estimate upon 
the complex and hidden burden of SST compliance costs is no easy task, and one that has 
not been undertaken before, although the superannuation industry itself collected and 
presented estimates of SST start-up costs to the Government in 1996/97. The 
independence of our survey (from the superannuation industry, Government and any 
other vested interests) has thus much to commend it, although we acknowledge that the 
 
10 1,493,331 survey fund members divided by 22.9 million population; and $19.67 billion survey fund 











                                                
number of participants (arising partly through such independence) renders drawing 
industry-wide conclusions problematic.  
 
It is worth emphasising compliance cost terminology and also interpretation of data 
within the superannuation industry. This section is concerned with estimates of gross 
recurrent compliance costs, namely the resource costs to the country of a particular tax 
for any one year of its operation, and excluding start-up costs. We do not make any 
attempt to estimate net compliance costs ie taking into account any offsetting benefits 
such as cash flow benefits, tax deductibility and managerial benefits, as is often the case 
with business tax compliance cost studies (eg Evans et al, 1997). Compliance costs may 
be presented in disaggregate terms for survey data, and, where survey data is reasonably 
representative of the specific tax population, this may be ‘grossed up’ later in terms of the 
specific tax population to give an aggregate gross compliance costs estimate. 
Unfortunately, this cannot be undertaken with any confidence because of the low number 
of respondent funds in this study. This study refers to ‘members’ and ‘SST members’ for 
simplicity. It must be noted that strictly speaking the data we refer to is ‘members’ 
accounts’ and ‘members’ accounts that are liable for the SST’, respectively. Our findings 
are presented primarily for the 2000-01 financial year ie in annual terms, although some 
data relates back to the SST’s first main year of operation, 1996-97, and the years in 
between. 
 
Before proceeding with our findings on recurrent compliance costs, it is worth briefly 
citing an earlier estimate of SST start-up costs by Clare (1998). There are very few 
studies anywhere in the world that estimate tax start-up costs. Of the few that exist, it 
appears that start-up costs are significant and typically up to one year’s worth of recurrent 
compliance costs. SST compliance costs for the first year of funds surveyed have been 
estimated at $141 million, or 30% of first year SST revenue of $470 million (Clare, 
1998). Overall, SST start-up cost estimates follow the usual regressive pattern found in 
nearly all tax compliance cost studies. Such an estimate of SST start-up costs provides a 
later reference point for recurrent cost estimates.  
 
The 40 funds that participated have a wide range of varying characteristics.  Although our 
respondents represent a wide range of the industry in terms of asset size and number of 
members per fund, overall there is a bias towards larger funds, reflecting our original 
surveying source of the largest 300 funds in Australia. Of our 40 respondent funds, four 
may be classified as industry, five public and the majority (28) corporate; 17 are 
accumulated, one is defined and 19 are hybrid11. Also, our findings are based on 
qualitative assessments from our respondents and various sources within the industry and 
elsewhere, as well as the usual quantitative estimates. Given such a large, complex 
industry, such qualitative assessments should also be treated with some caution, as there 
may be specific exceptions to our sample and ensuing evaluation. 
 
 











In terms of asset size, they range from $31 million up to over $8 billion (2000-01 figures, 
and hereafter unless otherwise specified), with 33 funds between $31.4 million and $1.1 
billion. The survey funds’ mean asset size is $530 million and the median $105 million. 
For comparison, the industry average is $117.6 million excluding the 222,738 self-
managed funds (Rice and McEwin, 2002).  It should be re-emphasised that our study 
focused on Australia’s largest superannuation funds by asset size. Our respondent funds 
represent around 3.8% of superannuation assets in Australia. A summary of our 
respondent funds by asset size and total fund members (for 2000-01) is presented in 
Table 2, which shows the sample bias towards larger funds. Our sample included three 
out of the four superannuation funds with assets greater than $1 billion.  
 
 
   
Table 2: Respondent Funds by Asset Size and Total Fund Members, 2000-01  
 
Fund Asset  
$ million 
Average Fund 
Asset Size $ 
million 
Average number of total 








Less than 50  38      994 13.5 90.5 
50-99  75    2,669 32.4 3.1 
100 – 499 221   13,529 37.9 4.5 
500 – 999 781     9,387  5.4 1.0 
1,000 and over            3,481            312,288 10.8 <0.1 
* Derived from data from R. Clare (2002), Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) 
Research Centre (private communication), with thanks. 
 
 
Membership of funds surveyed ranged from just 135 members (all liable for SST) to 
1.142 million members (with 1,500 SST members). One fund, with assets of $34.2 
million, reported 1,774 members with only two liable for SST. Thus our respondents 
have a wide range of SST members expressed as a percentage of all their members, 
ranging from practically zero up to 100%. Overall, average (total) membership was 
41,481 and the median 2,461, with average SST membership of 714 (2%) and a median 
figure of 183 (7%).  For comparison, the industry average is 6,106 members per fund, 
excluding self-managed funds (Rice and McEwin, 2002). A breakdown of respondent 



















 Total Fund Members 











Less than 50  3    3 
50-99 2 4    6 
100-499 2 6 2 2  12 
500-999  1 1  1 3 
1,000-4,999  1  1 1 3 
5,000 and over    1 1 2 
        Total 4 15 3 4 3 29 
 
 
Respondent funds reported a wide range of SST remittances to the ATO, ranging from 
just $3,000 paid in SST (for the fund with two SST members) to $5.1 million for the 
largest fund (assets value of $8,121 million, with 6,000 SST members). Average SST 
paid per member was $951, with a median of $1,098. The relative closeness of these 
mean and median figures is reassuring as it suggests that the effect of the SST on 
respondent funds’ members is reasonably homogeneous between different sized funds.    
 
Overall annual administrative costs of respondent funds ranged from only $35,000 up to 
$27 million, with mean and median figures of $2.1 million and $460,000 respectively.   
Expressed as a percentage of fund asset values, mean administrative costs represented 
0.4% (median 0.44%). This compares with an industry average of 0.51% excluding self-
managed funds (Rice and McEwin, 2002). These findings are reasonable (and expected) 
given an ‘economies of scale effect’ in the operation of most superannuation funds, and 
reflect the larger size of our respondent funds compared with the industry average.  
 
 





The mean annual SST compliance costs for the funds surveyed was $44,900 (median 
$12,000).  The significant gap between the mean and median reflects the effect of one 
large fund in the sample in particular, incurring high compliance costs of $594,000 
because of its size.  The next highest value is $99,000. When we remove this highest (and 
possibly outlying) observation from the sample, the mean reduces substantially to 
$23,740 (and the median reduces to $11,500). 
 
In order to verify the validity of respondents estimates a ‘check’ question was included 











                                                
annual administration costs?’. In many instances respondents gave a range of dollar 
savings in reply, which were taken as ‘low savings’ and ‘high savings’ estimates. For the 
year of investigation (2000-01) ratios of savings to SST costs of 1.06 (upper range of 
savings) and 0.98 (lower range of savings) indicate that respondents detailed evaluation 
of SST compliance costs and other estimates are verified within a reasonable margin. 
However, these figures indicate that respondents tend to slightly over-estimate 
compliance costs when asked for only an approximate estimate of savings compared with 
a more detailed and time-consuming estimate of specific components.   These ratios lend 
credibility to the estimates received on both a cost basis and a savings basis.   
 
SST costs per fund (mean $44,900) lie between the upper (mean $45,000) and lower 
(mean $40,800) estimates of SST cost savings, as one would expect.  In some instances 
however, the minimal savings from abolition were zero or negligible and the reason for 
this is the out-sourcing of administrative functions, where external administrators absorb 
the costs of the SST as part of the full fee for complete administrative services. Maximum 
savings were as high as $600,000, which closely reflects the maximum detailed SST cost 
estimate of $594,000.   
 
 
Relative Estimates of SST Compliance Costs 
 
(1) SST Costs per Fund Member 
 
When spread over all members SST compliance costs are $14.40 per fund member (in 
2000/01), with a median estimate of $4.16 per fund member. The range in per member 
costs is particularly extensive, from a minimum of $0.42 per fund member to a maximum 
of $222 per fund member. The minimum value related to the fund with the greatest asset 
value in the sample, being $8.12 billion.  This fund also had the third largest number of 
fund members in the sample.  The maximum per member cost was experienced by the 
fund with the smallest number of fund members.   
 
(2) SST Costs per SST Member 
 
For the year 2000-01 the mean (gross recurrent) costs of the SST per SST member were 
$140, with a median estimate of $8412.  
 
In terms of variability between funds, SST compliance costs per SST member ranged 
from a low of $4.29 up to $703.95, for funds with 7,000 SST members (45% of all 
members) and only two SST members (0.1% of all members) respectively. The majority 
 
12 Calculated from the cost per SST member for each fund; these are then averaged. Therefore only those 











of funds (60%) had SST compliance costs per SST member of less than $100. The vast 
majority of funds (81%) had SST compliance costs per member of less than $10. The 
main reason for high, above average SST compliance costs is the failure to achieve 
economies of scale – either through a low absolute number of SST members eg funds 
with two and 135 members, or a low percentage of SST members eg a large fund with 
only 1.3% SST members of its total 1.142 million membership. These three funds had 
SST compliance costs per SST member of $704, $222 and $396 respectively.   
 
 
(3) SST Costs per Member and SST Paid 
 
Over 80% of funds remitted over $100,000 in SST. There was a fairly even spread of low 
SST costs per member (less than $4 pa) in terms of the amount of SST paid by each fund 
in absolute terms, as shown in Table 4.   
 
 
Table 4: SST Costs per Member and SST Paid per Fund, 2000-01 
 
 SST Paid ($) 






100k-499k 500k-999k 1m & 
over 
Total 
Less than 1 1  1 1 1 4 
1-4  1 7  4 12 
5-9  1 4  1 6 
10-14 1  1   2 
15 and over   1   1 
        Total 2 2 14 1 6   25 
 
 
(4) SST Costs as a percentage of SST paid 
 
When expressed as a percentage of SST paid, SST compliance costs are 15.53% (median 
4.34%).  It should be noted that in one instance, the compliance costs of SST exceeded 
the revenue collected for certain funds, peaking at 110% of SST paid.  This example 
clearly offends tax principles of simplicity and efficiency. Perhaps not surprisingly, this 
fund had the largest number of fund members, and also the second highest asset value in 
the sample.  However, the fund with the lowest percentage of costs (0.56%) had only 
1,850 (less than the median) members and $272 million (more than the median) in assets.  
Accordingly, it would be difficult to justify a correlation between asset size or 
membership and compliance costs.  
 












In terms of respondent funds’ administrative costs, SST compliance costs are estimated to 
account for 3.86% (median 2.48%). The SST costs percentage component of annual fund 
administration costs reaches over 17% for maximum figures and less than 0.25% for the 
minimum in the sample.   
 
(6) SST Costs per dollar of Fund Assets 
 
In terms of per dollar of assets, SST compliance costs are, not surprisingly, negligible at 
less than $0.01 for every $2,632 of assets (for even the highest recorded estimates). 
 
Overall, on the basis of our findings, we consider that a mean estimate of SST 
compliance costs of around $140 per SST member in 2000-01 may be an indicative 
magnitude of cost given the complexities and apparent inefficiencies (in terms of fund 
size and membership composition) in the industry. A more conservative estimate using 
the median figure is $84 per SST member. We recognise that it is arguable that certain 
atypical funds may distort our estimates. Against that, the selection of larger funds for our 
sample would tend, ceteris paribus, to lead to lower estimates than might exist in the 
industry overall because of an economies of scale effect. 
 
 
Characteristics and Time Trends of SST Compliance 
Costs   
 
wo major characteristics of SST compliance costs are investigated in this section.  The 
first consideration is the ‘economies of scale’ effect, sometimes referred to as the 
regressivity of tax compliance costs, and well recognised in compliance cost literature eg 
Sandford et al (1989), Evans et al (1997), Pope (2001). In other words, in this context, 
smaller funds would be expected to bear higher SST compliance costs expressed as a 
percentage of SST liability than would larger funds. Secondly, the time trend, or what has 
been happening to SST compliance costs since SST effectively became operational in 
1996-97, is also investigated. As mentioned earlier, the limitations of our data need to be 
recognised. 
 
Measures of SST compliance costs include SST costs in aggregate dollar terms, as a 
percentage of fund administrative costs, as a percentage of SST paid, per SST member, 
and per total fund member. Measures of size include the number of SST members in the 
fund, the number of total fund members and the value of fund assets.    
 
There is limited evidence to support the economies of scale effect regarding SST 
compliance costs, as shown in Tables 5 to 16. However, this effect is significantly less 











fund size is expressed in terms of SST members or all funds members makes little 
difference. For example, SST compliance costs per SST member range from $32 to $302 
between 250 to 708 SST fund members yet are as low as $75 for a fund with only 53 SST 
members. A fund with 80 SST members reports SST compliance costs of $34 per SST 
member compared with $396 for a fund with 1,500 SST members. In support of 
economies of scale, four of the top six largest funds in terms of SST members (794 to 
7,000) report SST compliance costs per member between $14.40 and $4.30. Of the 13 
funds with 200 or more SST members, six reported SST compliance costs per member 
greater than $90. SST costs per SST member range from $222 for a fund with only 135 
(total) members to $396 for a fund with 1.142 million members. In between lows of $28, 
$34 and $14 are recorded by funds with 453, 1,150 and 1,846 members respectively. 
Highs of $704 and $405 are recorded for funds with 1,774 and 1,247 members 
respectively. These findings are surprising given the clear-cut economies of scale in 
nearly all studies of tax compliance costs previously published.  
 
A reasonable threshold for SST costs appears to be less than 4 per cent of fund 
administrative costs, with 72 per cent of (respondent) funds in this category (see Table 6). 
Of the funds with costs greater than 4 per cent, all but one (24 per cent of total) have less 
than 250 SST members. This tends to support the existence of some degree of economies 
of scale. As a percentage of SST paid, a threshold seems to be less than 10 per cent, with 
69 per cent of funds in this category and 58 per cent less than 5 per cent (see Table 7). 
Funds with a low number of SST members (less than 250) accounted for 61 per cent of 
all funds in this under 10% of SST paid category, weakening any economies of scale 
argument. The evidence on SST costs in dollars per SST member tends to support some 
economies of scale, with five of nine funds reporting costs of less than $10 per SST 
member having SST membership of 750 or more (see Table 8). Further, funds with 
higher absolute costs tended to be smaller. When spread over all fund members, whilst all 
funds with over $10 pa SST dollar costs per member had less than 250 SST members, 
half of the 22 funds with costs under $10 pa had less than 250 members (see Table 9). 
Thus many funds with a relatively lower number of SST members can achieve relatively 
low SST compliance costs, thus tending to negate any strong economies of scale 
argument. Note that the number of observations in the following Tables is less than the 













Table 5: The effect of Fund Size in Terms of the Number of SST Members on SST 
Compliance Costs, 2000-01 
 
 SST Compliance Costs ($) 
Number of SST 













Less than 99 5 3     8 
100-249 3 2 2    7 
250-499 1  2  1  4 
500-749     1  1 
750-999  1     1 
1,000 or more  1 2 1  1 5 
        Total 9 7 6 1 2 1   26 
 
 
Table 6: The Effect of Fund Size in Terms of the Number of SST Members on SST 
Compliance Costs as a Percentage of Fund Administrative Costs, 2000-01 
 
 SST costs as a % of Fund Administrative Costs 
Number of SST 















Less than 99 1 3 1 1 2   8 
100-249  1 3 1  1 1 7 
250-499   2     2 
500-749  1      1 
750-999 1     1  2 
1,000 or more 1 1 3     5 
        Total 3 6 9 2 2 2 1 25 
 
 
Table 7: The Effect of Fund Size in Terms of the Number of SST Members on SST 
Compliance Costs as a Percentage of SST Paid, 2000-01 
 
 SST costs as a % of SST Paid 














Less than 99 3 2  1  2 8 
100-249 5 1    1 7 
250-499 2   2   4 
500-749      1 1 
750-999 1      1 
1,000 or more 4     1 5 













Table 8: The Effect of Fund Size in Terms of the Number of SST Members on SST 
Compliance Costs in Dollars per SST Member, 2000-01 
 
 SST Costs in Dollars Per SST Member 
Number of SST 





  1 2 3 1 1 8 
100-249   2 3 2   7 
250-499   1 1 1 1  4 
500-749     1   1 
750-999   1     1 
1,000 or more 1 1 2   1  5 
Total 1 1 7 6 7 3 1   26 
 
 
Table 9: The effect of fund size in terms of the number of SST members on SST 
compliance costs in dollars per total fund member, 2000-01 
 
 SST Costs in Dollars per Total Fund Member 
Number of SST Members in Fund Less than 1 1-4 5-9 10-24 25-39 40 and over Total 
Less than 99 1 4 1 1 1  8 
100-249  2 3 1  1 7 
250-499  3 1    4 
500-749 1      1 
750-999  1     1 
1,000 or more 2 2 1    5 
        Total 4 12 6 2 1 1    26 
 
 
In terms of the relationship between SST compliance costs, measured in various ways, 
and fund size measured by total fund membership, a number of larger funds have high or 
relatively high compliance costs. For example, one fund with between 10,000 and 49,999 
fund members had SST compliance costs of over 10% of fund administrative costs (Table 
11). In terms of percentage of tax paid, half of the funds with SST compliance costs 
greater than 25% of SST paid had total membership of 10,000 and over (Table 12). Over 
a quarter of funds (3 out of 11) with SST compliance costs of $100 or more per SST 
member had 10,000 or more members (Table 13). Although 5 out of 17 smaller funds 
(with less than 5,000 members) had SST compliance costs of $10 or more per (total) fund 
member, 12 out of the 17 achieved costs of less than $10 (Table 14). The largest funds 
(with 10,000 or more members) had SST compliance costs of $4 or less (Table 14). Thus 
all but the smallest funds (less than 1,000 members) are capable of matching their larger 












Table 10: The effect of fund size in terms of total fund members on SST compliance 
costs, 2000-01 
 
 SST Compliance Costs ($) 














Less than 1,000 1 1 1    3 
1,000 - 4,999 8 4 2    14 
      5,000 -  9,999  2 2    4 
10,000-49,999   1 1 1  3 
50,000 and over   1  1 1 3 
        Total 9 7 7 1 2 1 27 
 
 
Table 11: The effect of fund size in terms of total fund members on SST compliance 
costs as a percentage of fund administrative costs, 2000-01 
 




















Less than 1,000   1   1  3 
1,000 – 4,999 1 3 5 2 1   12 
5,000-9,999 1 1 1   1  4 
10,000-49,999  1 1    1 3 
50,000 and 
over 
1 1 1     3 
        Total 3 6 9 2 2 2 1   25 
 
 
Table 12: The effect of fund size in terms of total fund members on SST compliance 
costs as a percentage of SST paid, 2000-01 
 
 SST costs as a % of SST Paid 















Less than 1,000 2 1     3 
1,000 – 4,999 8 2    3 13 
5,000-9,999 2   2   4 
10,000-49,999 2     1 3 
50,000 and over 1     2 3 













Table 13: The effect of fund size in terms of total fund members on SST compliance 
costs in dollars per SST member, 2000-01 
 
 SST Costs in Dollars per SST Member 

















Less than 1,000   1  2   3 
1,000 – 4,999   4 5 2 1 1 13 
5,000-9,999   1 1 2   4 
10,000-49,999 1  1   1  3 
50,000 and over  1   1 1  3 
        Total 1 1 7 6 7 3 1   26 
 
 
Table 14: The effect of fund size in terms of total fund members on SST compliance 
costs in dollars per total fund member, 2000-01 
 
 SST Costs in Dollars per Total Fund Member 
Number of Fund Members Less 
than 1 
1-4 5-9 10-24 25-39 40 and 
over 
Total 
Less than 1,000    1 1 1 3 
1,000 – 4,999 1 6 5 2     14 
5,000-9,999  3 1    4 
10,000-49,999  3     3 
50,000 and over 3      3 
        Total 4 12 6 3 1 1   27 
 
 
Although there is no obvious relationship between fund asset size and SST compliance 
costs, measured in various ways13, it seems reasonable to conclude that the smaller funds 
(less than $100 million in assets) are capable of matching larger funds in terms of SST 
compliance costs, especially in terms of the percentage of SST paid (Table 15) and SST 
costs per fund member (Table 16).   
 
                                                 













Table 15: The effect of fund size in terms of fund assets on SST compliance costs as 
a percentage of SST paid, 2000-01 
 
 SST costs as a % of SST Paid 














Less than 49 1 1    1 3 
50-99 6 2    1 9 
100 – 499 4   2  3 9 
500 – 999 2      2 
1,000 and over 2     1 3 




Table 16: The effect of fund size in terms of fund assets on SST compliance costs in 
dollars per total fund member, 2000-01 
 
 SST Costs in Dollars per Total Fund Member 
Value of Fund Assets ($m) Less than 1 1-4 5-9 10-24 25-39 
40 and 
over Total 
Less than 49 1 1   1  3 
50-99  6 3    9 
100 – 499 1 2 3 3  1 10 
500 – 999  2     2 
1,000 and over 2      2 




It therefore appears that, on balance, factors other than size, however measured, appear 
responsible for varying levels of SST recurrent compliance costs. The exact nature of 
these factors appears complex and would require further investigation.  
 
Although based on limited numbers, particularly for earlier years, our survey provides 
some indication of the time trend in SST compliance costs since SST was introduced. 
Essentially the data shows that SST compliance costs are falling over a range of 
measures, as shown in Table 17. Thus SST compliance costs per SST member have fallen 
from around $691 in 1997/98 to around $140 in 2000-01, or by 80%. This is not 
surprising as it demonstrates the ‘learning curve’ effect and possibly that of economies of 
scale (although previous data is unclear on this effect). Over the same period the average 











01, or around 42%. The SST taxpaying population has increased since its introduction, 
particularly because of the inclusion of fringe benefits (from 30 June 2000) in the 
adjusted taxable income formula and also rising real income levels taking members above 
the SST threshold (although note that this is indexed). 
 
 
Table 17: (Mean) SST compliance costs from 1997-98 to 2000-01 
 
Year 




SST costs as a 
% of SST Paid 
SST Costs in 
Dollars 
per SST Member 
SST Costs in 
Dollars 
per Member 
1997-1998 16.00 76.24 691.19 48.56 
1998-1999 10.12 46.04 456.69 32.70 
1999-2000 7.67 27.19 361.06 25.25 
2000-2001 3.86 15.53 139.76 14.40 




Composition of SST Compliance Costs 
 
The ongoing compliance costs of the SST involve both human and capital components.  
Our survey results that follow are reflective of the most widely experienced costs (in 
terms of the number of funds affected) as well as the most expensive costs (relative to 
other costs). 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate how various cost heads were affected by the 
introduction and operation of the SST.  No distinction was made between in-house and 
out-sourced costs.  For example, ‘IT Staff’ includes employees of the fund as well as 
external IT support services. The results show that the SST affected administration staff 
costs in 90% of the funds surveyed, representing the single most widely experienced cost 
across the industry.  Much of this can be attributable to the costs of training staff in the 
reporting requirements associated with the SST.  The impact on IT software costs and 
actuarial fees was also strongly felt, affecting 83% and 63% of the funds, respectively.  
IT software costs include the cost of upgrading existing software, and the use of the 
software to ‘record and report data’. Increased IT staff costs were prevalent amongst 
more than half the respondents.  In some cases, these costs were specific to SST in the 
form of ‘dedicated surcharge [IT] staff’. 
 
‘Other’ costs comprised of items not previously categorised elsewhere.  Under this head, 
one fund referred to the costs of outsourcing the SST reporting requirements to a third 











administration fees (exclusive of administration staff) and personnel officers were also 
additional costs.  It may be assumed that these costs are specific to funds that outsourced 
their SST administration, if not their entire administrative functions.  Several funds also 
pointed out that in addition to the cost heads, fund members were also affected by the 
SST.  Furthermore, costs were also incurred in the provision of ‘communications 
material’ to members.   
 
The relative costs incurred by each of these heads varied across the funds.  Respondents 
were asked to rank the cost heads, according to the most affected, second most affected 
and third most affected by the SST.  This ranking can be interpreted as a measure of the 
actual costs incurred as a result of the SST.  Fund sentiments concerning the items they 
felt were ‘most’ affected, or most costly, are summarised as follows. These results 
indicate that the magnitude of IT software costs was greater than that of administrative 
staff costs, even though more funds experienced increased administration costs than IT 
software costs.  
 
Data that is likely to throw further insight into the composition of SST compliance costs 
from other studies and surveys is extremely limited. ASFA (2001) found that the bulk of 
administration costs were taken up by labour (including fees for external administrators).  
Computer and communication expenses were also significant. As the priority given to 
communications increased, member communications became a ‘major and growing 
expense item’ (ASFA, 2001, p13). Professional fees were also noted as a ‘relatively high 
cost item’ (ibid.).  A previous CPA Australia survey estimated that the collection of the 
surcharge would cost Australian small business more than $30 million in accounting fees 
and charges alone (CPA, 1997).   
 
Previous ASFA studies found legislative and regulatory changes to be the single most 
significant factor impacting on administration costs.  This shifted in the July 2001 results 
that reported the need for specialist advice and member communications as the most 
important factors. 
 
The Bateman and Piggott (1999, p15) survey reported increased ongoing administration 
costs due to the surcharge for 90% of the respondents.  Most reported an increase in costs 
of between 0% and 5% for most funds though more than 10% of respondents experienced 
cost increases greater than 10%.  The proportion of costs attributable to contribution 
collections and processing ranged from less than 5% for corporate funds to up to 50% for 
industry funds (ibid.).  Aggregate administration costs for the 1997-8 year were measured 













                                                
Effect of Abolishing SST but Not Reporting 
Requirement on Fund Members 
 
It should be recognised that, as part of overall Government taxation policy, the ATO may 
wish to continue to collect data on fund members that it currently obtains from funds 
through SST administration even if SST was to be abolished14. It is worth noting that for 
constitutional reasons, the regulator (APRA) does not have powers to mandate reporting 
requirements to the same extent that the ATO can under Commonwealth taxation heads 
of power15. Reasons for this may include a wider policy of tracking income and 
investment flows of ‘high tax revenue risk’ individuals or sectors as part of its efforts to 
minimise the ‘cash economy’. This study does not speculate on these costs for the 
superannuation industry as our objective is to focus on SST compliance costs.  
 
Apart from the actual transaction costs of paying the SST on behalf of members, all other 
compliance costs relating to the SST are costs arising from the reporting requirements 
under SST legislation.  Therefore an abolition of the surcharge liability alone, without 
abolishing the reporting requirements, would not result in any significant reduction in 
compliance costs, though taxpayers would welcome the disappearance of the tax.  If SST 
was abolished, then any ensuing ATO administrative or reporting requirements on the 
industry would form part of funds’ overall administrative costs and would have to be 
spread over all funds’ members.   
 
This issue may well have to be considered by the Government, ATO and the 





Aggregate estimates and caveats 
 
The small number of funds surveyed renders the drawing of policy implications rather 
tenuous, and the authors fully recognise this.  No doubt the administrative and 
compliance costs of the SST are but one of many factors in Government tax policy 
making, and one that Government may be inclined to give relatively less weight to than, 
say, revenue raising and equity arguments. Nonetheless, on the basis that some 
 
14 It appears that the Government’s newly introduced co-contribution arrangement will depend on data 
deriving from the SST. 
15 However, it may be argued that APRA relies on its tax and corporations power. It can ask and require 
information on contributions, and does to a degree, albeit at an aggregate level.  Arguably, it chooses not to 











                                                
illumination is better than no lighting at all, we cautiously draw the following policy 
implications from the foregoing analysis and a very tentative aggregate estimate. 
 
An upper estimate of gross recurrent compliance costs of the SST is around $126 million 
for 2000/01 based on mean compliance costs of $140 per SST member16, representing 
18% of SST tax revenue of $699 million. A lower estimate of gross recurrent compliance 
costs of the SST is around $76 million for 2000/01 based on median compliance costs of 
$84 per SST member17, representing 10.9% of SST tax revenue of $699 million18. 
However, it must be re-emphasised that our estimate is derived from larger 
superannuation funds that theoretically should have lower compliance costs than smaller 
funds.  
 
For the 2000/01 financial year, operating expenses for the superannuation industry19 
amounted to $3.5 billion (APRA, 2002), representing an annual cost of $155 per member 
account.   Taking these annual per member account costs, our estimate of $14.40 per fund 
member for the SST represents 9.3% ($14.4020/$155) of annual per member 
administration costs21. However, in the context of an average administrative cost per fund 
member of $110.84 ($2,576 million in administrative costs divided by 23.24 million 
accounts; Rice and McEwin, 2002, pp18 and 16 respectively) the relative percentage 
estimates change somewhat. SST compliance costs represent between 3.8% and 13% of 
all fund members’ average administrative costs22. In comparison, the annual per member 
costs for the SST as a percentage of annual administration costs for our surveyed funds 
are lower, at 3.86%.  This might be explained by the size of the funds surveyed, being 




It is a reasonable expectation especially by people outside of the superannuation industry 
that SST compliance costs would be borne in full by SST members. Indeed, this may 
have been the Government’s original intention and supposition. However, in practice 
 
16 $140 times 900,000 SST assessments in 2000/01. Note that this mean estimate of $140 includes some 
funds with very high SST compliance costs that ‘pulls’ the mean higher. The extent to which these are 
outliers is difficult if not impossible to tell given our small sample. The 900,000 population figure is based 
on the number of SST assessments and not the number of SST payers (refer earlier discussion). This 
appears reasonable given that fund SST compliance costs are based on actual account operation. This issue 
may, however, affect any estimate of SST operating costs that includes the ATO’s administrative costs of 
the SST.  
17 $84 (median estimate) times 900,000 SST assessments in 2000/01.   
18 Based on SST revenue of $699 million (ATO, 2002, Taxation Statistics 1999-2000, p216). This figure is 
significantly higher than the earlier ATO SST revenue estimate for 2000-01 of $589 million. 
19 This excludes RSAs and Assets regulated under the Life Act. 
20 See Table 17. 
21 Using our median survey estimate of $4.16 SST per fund member gives a much lower percentage 
estimate of 2.7%. 











                                                
SST compliance costs tend to be spread over all funds members by nearly all funds (95% 
of funds surveyed reported this policy) through members’ fees, which inevitably reduce 
the national pool of funds for retirement. The effect of this practice is arguable. On one 
hand this is theoretically inequitable and counters usual tax policy objectives by 
transferring SST compliance costs from the targeted group of higher income earners to 
lower and middle income earners.  As funds generally charge the same membership fees 
to all members, without discriminating on the basis of liability for the surcharge, the 
result is that all superannuation account holders are affected by the tax, despite any 
liability to pay the tax.  The remaining 5% of funds that did not equally spread the costs 
across all members were employer-sponsored funds where the employers themselves 
bore the administration costs rather than the employees and hence members’ fees and 
their effect on superannuation benefits were not in issue. 
 
In effect, nearly all fund member accounts are subject to additional costs of between 
$4.16 pa and $14.40 pa for SST recurrent compliance costs, rather than SST members 
only paying between an additional $84 pa and $140 pa. Many would argue that, whatever 
the reasons, and remembering that these are estimates only based on respondent data, this 
is an inequitable policy outcome of the SST. However, against that view it may be argued 
that it would be inequitable for a few surcharge payers to foot the bill in a fund where the 
ATO requires reporting on thousands of others to establish that they do not have to pay.  
Administration costs are just as related to not paying the surcharge as to paying the 
surcharge. It would seem unfair if, say, someone with a $1,000 surcharge bill had to pay a 
$500 administration fee.   
 
Another factor in the equity issue is the extent to which high income is equivalent to high 
wealth, or at least high potential superannuation benefits. Recent data from the IFSA, 
cited at the Senate Select Committee (2002)23, suggests that there is a wide range in 
superannuation account balances of SST payers, and that the average age of SST account 
holders is around 47 and their median account balance is only about $50,000. This re-
inforces the earlier argument that SST is not limited to the ‘rich’; equity arguments are 




Low or reasonably low tax compliance costs are one indicator of the degree of simplicity 
of a particular tax. Thus another perspective on SST compliance costs is to compare them 
with other tax compliance costs. Expressing tax compliance costs as a percentage of tax 
revenue is the usual measure for making inter-tax comparisons, and we use that measure 
here. It must be noted that the percentage compliance cost estimates used for all taxes 
apart from SST are for 1994/95, and derived from the Evans et al (1997) study for the 
 
23 Hansard, Senate Select Committee (2002), Superannuation and Standards of Living in Retirement, 10 











                                                
ATO. It is likely that for some taxes, particularly those with lower revenue, these 
percentage estimates would have changed over a six year period. Of course the 
Wholesale Sales Tax (WST) has been abolished and replaced by the Goods and Services 
Tax (GST) in July 2000. As yet, there are no reliable estimates of Australian GST 
recurrent compliance costs, although overseas studies give some indication of the 
magnitude involved (eg Sandford and Hasseldine, 1992, for New Zealand). Also, the 
estimates for other taxes are often taxpayer compliance costs ie net costs after offsetting 
benefits such as cash flow are taken into account, rather than gross or social costs, and 
are therefore somewhat lower than the SST costs24.  
 
On available estimates (from Evans et al, 1997, pp76, 74, 57 and ix), at worst SST social 
compliance costs (at 18%25) are one of the highest of all major Commonwealth taxes26. 
They are significantly higher than PAYE27 (1.3%), personal income tax (4%), income tax 
including Capital Gains Tax (6.8%) and the now abolished WST (4.7%). However, it 
must be emphasised that these are taxpayer compliance costs ie after taking into account 
cash flow and other offsets, and therefore lower than the SST estimate that did not allow 
for any offsets. These taxes excluding WST account for $79.5 billion or 87.7% of 
Commonwealth Government tax revenue in 1994/95 (Evans et al, 1997, p48). Only the 
FBT (17.1%) and company income tax (15.8%) have comparable social compliance costs 
to SST, and the nature of FBT renders any comparison problematical28. Even at best 
using the median estimates from our study, SST social compliance costs (at 10.9%) are 
higher than the compliance costs of most Commonwealth taxes and significantly higher 
than the most efficient (employers’) taxpayer PAYE tax compliance costs (1.3%). In a 
sense comparison with PAYE tax compliance costs offers the most appropriate yardstick 
as both SST and PAYE compliance costs represent costs borne by third parties in 
collecting taxes from personal income taxpayers by the most efficient method, namely 
withholding.         
 
The time trend for SST compliance costs is likely to be downwards for a number of 
theoretical reasons, both in terms of absolute dollar costs and when expressed as a 
percentage of tax paid. First, there is the ‘learning curve’ effect. Secondly, as a greater 
number of taxpayers enter the SST net because of rising real incomes, funds may earn 
 
24 Evans et al (1997) use the terms taxpayer and social compliance costs, whereas Sandford, Pope and other 
researchers prefer the more traditional terms gross and net compliance costs respectively. Extra care is 
therefore needed when making inter-study and inter-tax comparisons. Such comparisons are fraught with 
difficulty (see Evans et al, 1997, pp58-60 for useful discussion, based on work by Sandford, 1995, p405). 
25 Note that the survey estimate percentage (based on respondents’ SST payments) is lower at 15.5%. 
26 The now abolished Prescribed Payments System had estimated compliance costs of 22% of tax revenue 
in 1994/95 (Evans et al, 1997). 
27 The Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) system, part of major Government tax reform and commencing in July 
2000, replaced Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE). The term applicable at the time of the cited study is used 
throughout this research.   
28 Essentially FBT may increase the Personal Income Tax revenue by encouraging taxpayers to take their 
remuneration as normal salary rather than in the form of fringe benefits such as a company car. Thus 











                                                
economies of scale because of largely fixed costs ie SST compliance costs are being 
spread over a greater number of taxpayers over time (although this study has found little, 
if any, evidence of economies of scale; refer earlier discussion). Further, the Government 
has changed the definition of adjusted taxable income for SST, such that it now includes 
fringe benefits (from 30 June 2000), thereby bringing in a larger number of taxpayers into 
the SST net for the first time. Inflation and bracket creep per se does not present a 
problem for SST as the SST adjusted taxable income threshold is indexed each tax year. 
 
The lowering of SST rates announced during the 2001 Commonwealth elections are due 
to take effect from 1 July 200229. The 15% rate is to be reduced to 13.5% in 2002-03, 
12% in 2003-04 and 10.5% in 2004-05. Other things remaining unchanged, this measure 
will lower SST revenue thereby increasing SST compliance costs expressed as a 
percentage of tax revenue and making any comparisons with other tax compliance costs 
worse than they otherwise would have been. It is interesting that the Government 
favoured probably the more politically expedient measure of lowering rates rather than 
increasing the current adjusted taxable income threshold of $85,000. Raising the 
threshold level is a widely held principle in lowering tax compliance costs (Sandford et 
al, 1989, p213; Pope 2001, pp141-142). However, whilst this is far less applicable to SST 
for the reasons discussed earlier, concerns regarding SST compliance costs were 
obviously not a feature in the Government’s rate changes to SST announced during its 




To sum up, the depth nature of this study compared with the large scale survey estimates 
of Evans et al (1997) renders comparisons very problematical. Nonetheless it appears 
that, from the estimates available, SST compliance costs are much higher than 
employers’ PAYE tax compliance costs. SST compliance costs are invariably spread over 
all fund members for obvious practical, cost considerations yet such a policy is counter to 
equity and user-pays arguments. SST compliance costs are tending to fall over time (both 
in absolute dollar costs per member and % of tax revenue terms). In this researchstudy we 
found little if any evidence of economies of scale (the usual major reason in many other 
compliance cost studies), although that is not to say that they do not exist. The inference 
is that factors such as administrative ‘learning’ experience and improving information 
technology are responsible for costs falling over time. The recent lowering of SST rates 
and ensuing revenue reductions may reverse this trend as far as SST costs expressed as a 
percentage of SST revenue is concerned.    
 
Overall, there is a reasonably strong case for the abolition of SST on the grounds of high 
recurrent compliance costs in comparison with other Commonwealth taxes, and, 
somewhat ironically, because of equity arguments arising from the fact that SST 
compliance costs are generally not borne by SST taxpayers. 
 











    




‘The surcharge/tax is a rather strange piece of public policy – by design it plucks the 
tax goose in a way which generates the maximum squeals and discomfort for both the 
goose and the plucker!’  (Clare, 1998, p22) 
 
The above quote illustrates the ASFA views of the compliance costs of administrating the 
SST for both the funds liable to pay it and the ATO who collect it.  Effectively the 
taxpayer is hit thrice, in terms of ATO administration costs, their own and their 
superannuation fund’s compliance costs, plus their SST liability incurred.  Described as a 
‘nightmare come true’, the SST was expected to cost funds millions, according to the 
CPA Australia (CPA, 1998).  The economic implications of such high administrative 
costs are the diversion of resources away from more productive efforts (Australian 
Accountant, 1997).  A Superannuation Centre of Excellence report of the problems 
associated with the SST has been colourfully labelled ‘Thirty Ways to Lose Your Super’, 
a label representative of the industry wide contempt for the surcharge (Australian 
Accountant, 1996). Other commentators eg Blizzard (1997), Hudson (1999), have also 
voiced their opposition to SST.   
 
Survey responses were obtained from fund administrators directly responsible for 
reporting details of the SST.  In total, 32 out of 40 responses (80%) indicated support for 
the abolition of the SST to be given a high priority status (priority of one or two on a 
scale of one to five) by the industry’s more prominent and experienced personnel.  There 
were a number of reasons offered for this view (in respondent’s own words): 
 
Superannuation is already overtaxed and very complicated; SST adds another level of 
complexity and cost. 
 
Government should be encouraging and not discouraging superannuation savings. 
 
For large groups of members the costs of collecting revenue is greater than the revenue 
collected; too expensive to administer relative to the revenue collected. 
 
Complexity, inefficiency and cost of administration, collection arrangements, difficulty of 
keeping track of movements of former members getting assessed long after exiting a fund; 












Costs of communicating to members, answering queries, causes members distress; 
Surcharge is not fully understood by members leading to confusion for call centre staff 
dealing with members directly. 
 
Costs of paying assessments. 
 
Reduced retirement benefits for members as they pay for increased administration fees. 
 
Unnecessary tax burden. 
 
The tax is inequitable (costs borne by all members). 
 
Tax is discriminatory and biased against self-funded retirees, the ‘rich’, defined benefit 
fund members (some of whom pay surcharge on contributions which may never represent 
full benefit potential if resigning before 55). 
 
Costs of labour time, administration, compliance, IT, training, member communications 
– high cost for no return to funds and members. 
 
Politically ‘sneaky’ - the Government set up the surcharge underhandedly as not a new 
tax when obviously it is.  The way it is run is totally unbelievably complex – they should 
have done it via tax returns and not via super funds.  But if would have been obvious to 
individuals that it was another tax. 
 
Biggest problem administration-wise is the time lag and subsequent member movements 
especially funds that have been wound up, merged or taken over. 
 
The delay in collecting the tax is often well over two years. 
 
Surcharge is a burden on fund administration and an unnecessary cost impost of a 
scheme’s membership for such a limited number of high-income members.   
 
Survey suggestions for reform 
 
Survey respondents made the following recommendations for SST reform: 
 
The contribution tax should be dropped to zero so that the SST would no longer be 
necessary 
 
Too expensive to administer for the revenue collected – cheaper to increase the high 












Main problem is time and effort in collecting data for ATO, answering member queries 
and paying surcharge assessments when they arrive.  Reduction in rates wouldn’t help; 
only outright abolition. 
 
Should be part of general tax collection.  
 
Should be abolished when overall change in taxation of superannuation is put in place 
 
More equitable to remove 15% contribution tax.   
 
Currently too many taxes involving superannuation.  Govt should be looking at 
abolishing if not the surcharge tax (this is the ‘messiest’ tax), the 15% contribution tax 
 
Threshold is really far too low.  One would think a figure of $175k would be more 
realistic.  However the total abolition of the tax would make superannuation easier to 





The SST was introduced in August 1996, and, according to the ATO, ‘is intended to limit 
the concessionality of employer and deductible personal superannuation contributions for 
high income earners’. For the 2000/01 year it is levied at a rate of up to 15% on the 
surchargeable contributions of fund members whose adjusted taxable income exceeds the 
surcharge threshold of $81,493. Essentially the adjusted taxable income is the summation 
of a member’s taxable income, surchargeable contributions and reportable fringe benefits 
(applicable from 30 June 2000). Thus for fund members with high employer 
contributions (and/or high individual voluntary contributions) the SST can impact on 
taxpayers with taxable incomes only somewhat above the $60,000 pa threshold of the 
47% top marginal tax rate. The SST becomes fully liable at the 15% rate at adjusted 
taxable income levels of $98,955 and above in 2000/01. The starting threshold is indexed 
each year.   
 
In 1999/2000 (the latest year for which reliable statistics are available), around 900,000 
SST assessments were issued that raised $589 million, or an average of $655 per 
assessment. 
 
From 1 July 2002, for the 2002/03 tax year, the Government proposed reducing the top 
rate of SST to 13.5%, with further reductions in subsequent years to 10.5% in 2004/05.  
Treasury estimates that this will reduce surcharge collections by $60 million, from an 












                                                
The ASFA (relying on APRA data) estimated the 1999/2000 administration costs for 
superannuation at $2.45 billion, for 21.7 million superannuation fund accounts, 6 million 
workers and $477 billion in fund assets, as at June 2000.  These figures indicate some 
inefficiencies, with multiple superannuation accounts for some Australian workers, 
arising largely through labour mobility and individuals’ failure to close dormant 
accounts. These administrative costs include tax compliance costs that would otherwise 
not exist but for the tax regime upon superannuation and that normally remain hidden. 
This study has focussed on SST compliance costs only and not all of the industry’s tax 
compliance costs. 
 
When discussing tax compliance cost estimates, caution must be used, especially in a 
study of this nature30. Particular care is needed when comparing findings from different 
studies or sources, as the methodology may be different. Nonetheless, hopefully some 
consensus of ‘order of magnitudes’ may emerge in an unduly complex industry where 
many regulatory and tax compliance costs are obfuscated. The authors draw conclusions 
on the basis that ‘some illumination is better than none at all’, and fully acknowledge the 
limitations of this study. 
   
There are very few studies anywhere in the world that estimate tax start-up costs. Of the 
few that exist, it appears that start-up costs are significant and typically up to one year’s 
worth of recurrent compliance costs. SST compliance costs have been estimated at (at 
least) $141 million, or 30% of first year SST revenue of $470 million, based on research 
by the ASFA (Clare, 1998). Overall, SST start-up cost estimates follow the usual 
regressive pattern found in nearly all tax compliance cost studies.   
 
SST (recurrent) compliance costs are falling over time, from an estimated $691 pa per 
SST member in 1997/98 to $140 pa per SST member in 2000/01. Estimated gross 
recurrent compliance costs of the SST are tentatively estimated at $76 million for 
2000/01 (based on our median estimate), representing 10.9% of SST tax revenue of $699 
million. However, it must be re-emphasised that our estimate is derived from larger 
superannuation funds that theoretically should have lower compliance costs than smaller 
funds. Further, and tending to lower SST compliance costs expressed as a percentage of 
tax revenue, SST revenue has been forecast to rise to around $820 million in 2001/02 and 
2002/03.  
 
From our small number of observations, it appears that smaller funds, measured on 
various criteria (eg number of SST members, number of total fund members, value of 
assets), are generally capable of achieving as low of cost levels as larger funds. In other 
words, SST compliance costs did not seem to exhibit the usual strong economies of scale 
effect found in nearly every other compliance cost study. However, this is not to say that 
they do not exist, but merely that our survey found little if any evidence supporting an 
 
30 Such cautionary comments are found in nearly all tax compliance cost studies eg Sandford et al (1989), 











economies of scale argument. Likely reasons for this finding include the very small 
number of observations and the complexity of the industry, particularly the effects of any 
out-sourcing on SST compliance cost estimates.   
 
SST compliance costs are (nearly always) spread over all fund members (for 
administrative ease and cost reasons). This is an inequitable (and probably unforeseen) 
outcome of SST. Estimated SST compliance costs (at around 11% of tax revenue) appear 
to be significantly higher than for other comparable taxes, especially withholding taxes, 
particularly the employers’ withholding tax Pay-As-You-Earn (now Pay-As-You-Go), 
given the usual caveats found in compliance cost studies. Indeed, great caution is needed 
with these aggregate SST estimates because of the nature of this particular compliance 
cost study. 
 
Given the nature of the industry and the available estimates, the relative magnitudes of 
SST start-up and recurrent compliance costs (at $141 million and $76 million 
respectively) seem reasonable. It is worth noting that, compared with the few studies that 
exist internationally, the ratio of SST start-up to recurrent costs is relatively higher than 
for other start-up cost studies. 
 
The superannuation industry, professional, tax and accounting bodies, and specialists in 
the field are all overwhelmingly critical of the SST for a variety of reasons, particularly 
its inefficiency, high compliance costs and inequity (because SST compliance costs are 
spread over all fund members). Around 80% of survey responses indicated industry 
support for the abolition of the SST to be given a high priority status. 
 
Overall Policy Implications 
 
ASFA, the IAA (Institute of Actuaries of Australia), the ACOSS (Australian Council of 
Social Service) and the Economics, Commerce and Industrial Relations Group have put 
forward recent proposals for reform (Kehl, 2001). These may be summarised into four 
major policy options, discussed briefly below. All of these policies would need detailed 
evaluation by the superannuation industry and Treasury in due course.   
  
First, there is much support for the abolition of the SST either in isolation or as part of 
overall superannuation reform (this study’s survey results and, for example, Kehl, 2001; 
TIA, 2001; CPA, 2002; ABA, 2002).  A much-voiced complaint is that superannuation is 
excessively taxed and complex.  The immediate benefits of abolishing the SST would be 
a simplification of the operation of superannuation funds (Kehl, 2001). There appears to 
be a growing consensus in favour of removing contributions taxes (eg CPA, 2002, p5). 
ASFA estimated the impact of removing contributions taxes to the value of $2.1 billion if 
implemented in 2001-02 (Clare, 2000), with delayed impact given that the SST relates to 
contributions made in previous periods. The CPA (2002, p5) state that ‘[t]he surcharge 











                                                
three-year period. We recognise that there are equity issues, but consider these should be 
dealt with in another manner.’ According to ASFA (Clare and Connor, 1998), ‘a more 
equitable way to deal with taxation of superannuation is at the benefits stage’. 
Presumably such a policy approach would have to address the loss of SST revenue of 
$589 million in 1999-2000 (ATO, 2001, p81), and an estimated $820 million in 2001/02 
and 2002/03 (Treasury estimate; Budget Papers, 2002-03). 
 
A major argument against abolition of SST is likely to be on equity grounds. 
Assessments of equity need to be based on a range of criteria and not just income. In the 
context of SST, it appears erroneous to equate high income to high wealth, or even high 
potential superannuation benefits (through high account balances). To re-iterate, recent 
data from the IFSA, cited at the Senate Select Committee (2002)31, suggests that there is 
a wide range in superannuation account balances of SST payers, and that their average 
age is around 47 and their median account balance is only about $50,000. This re-inforces 
the argument that SST is not limited to the ‘rich’; equity arguments are thus not a valid 
reason against the SST’s abolition. 
 
Secondly, Bateman and Piggott (1999) suggest that a conversion of the SST from a fund 
basis to an individual basis would be more equitable, consistent and simple.  The 
alternative approach for superannuation tax reform suggested by these authors involved 
an integration of fund and personal taxation. 
 
Thirdly, a well-established compliance cost principle, fully discussed in the international 
literature, is to raise the threshold level in order to reduce the number of taxpayers. Such 
a measure lowers gross (or social) compliance costs by taking taxpayers out of the ‘tax 
net’. However, given the peculiarities of both the superannuation industry and the SST, it 
is considered that this option is much less, if at all, applicable in any attempt to lower 
compliance costs. Whilst increasing the adjustable taxable income threshold for SST 
would lower tax compliance costs for some taxpayers the effects on the industry are 
likely to be small and possibly negligible. The major reason for this is the ATO’s 
reporting requirement on all fund members that is currently linked to the SST. Any 
changes to the adjusted taxable income threshold level are likely to be more concerned 
with equity, tax incentive and political factors rather than compliance cost and efficiency 
factors.   
 
Fourthly, much of the reporting requirements stem from the complex nature of SST 
assessment calculations and the numerous variables involved.  It appears that efforts to 
make the tax ‘fairer’ by taking into account so many variables have resulted in the 
imposition of an expensive tax in terms of administrative and compliance costs.  A 
simpler overall formula may eradicate the bulk of the reporting requirements, although it 
may come at the cost of equity. 
 
31 Hansard, Senate Select Committee on Superannuation, 10 July 2002, p246,  












To conclude, the simplest and ‘first choice’ policy measure that is likely to receive 
widespread superannuation industry support would be to abolish SST, either as a one-off 
measure or part of a much needed review of the overall taxation of the superannuation 
industry. The revenue shortfall could be made up by: increasing personal income tax rates 
above $60,000; increased taxation at the benefits stage (although time lags may raise 
difficulties); or increases in indirect taxation (because of high current Australian personal 
income tax rates).   
 
Other proposals fall into the ‘second best’ category. The least attractive would be any 
proposal to simply transfer the primary compliance cost burden of the SST from the 
superannuation industry to individual taxpayers. This would undoubtedly increase gross 
compliance costs (and possibly ATO administrative costs) of the SST still further. Any of 
these ‘second best’ proposals would need very careful research and implementation 






From the literature reviewed during the course of this research, it seems that there is a 
reasonable argument for a comprehensive and thorough review of superannuation 
arrangements in Australia. Of particular concern seems to be the prudential supervision 
and regulation of all superannuation funds, the burden of existing regulation and 
compliance, the availability of one source of reliable data and information on the 
industry, the taxation of superannuation and the provision of adequate retirement 
pensions given Australia’s ageing population. The relationship of the superannuation 
industry and its taxation to that of the social security system and the cost of providing the 
Government age pension is also worthy of further investigation. The authors would 
support any Government review in these areas. In any review, the principle of simplicity 
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